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Abstract: This study analyzes the firm-specific factors affecting the dividend payout decisions of the
companies whose shares are traded on the Borsa Istanbul stock exchange. To this end, the dynamic
panel regression is applied to 853 observations of yearly average of 106 companies listed on the Borsa
Istanbul between 2009 and 2015. According to results from the Arellano–Bover/Blunder-Bond
two-step system generalized method of moments, a statistically significant positive effect on
dividend payout was found in the relationship between the dividend payout of the previous year,
the company’s return on equity and the market value/book value ratio, liquidity and the company’s
size. The demonstration of a positive relationship between dividend payout and return on equity
supports the free cash flow hypothesis and the positive relationship with the previous year’s dividend
payout ratio supports the dividend smoothing hypothesis for Turkey.
Keywords: dividend; free cash flow hypothesis; dividend smoothing hypothesis; dividend
irrelevance hypothesis; dynamic panel; Borsa Istanbul
JEL Classification: G10; G30; G35; G38
1. Introduction
Until the middle of the 20th century it was unchallenged and generally accepted that dividend
payout had a positive effect on a company’s value. The “irrelevance hypothesis” developed by
Miller and Modigliani (1961) shook up this established confidence. According to the irrelevance
hypothesis, the profit generated by a company, under conditions of a fully competitive market,
must not have a positive effect on the company’s value. A company’s value can be increased only if the
company invests its retained earnings into projects which provide higher yield. Therefore, there is no
relationship between the company’s value and dividend payout. However, contrary to the irrelevance
hypothesis, in the real-world investors continue to request dividend payout with the expectation that
it will add positively to the company’s value. Companies’ dividend payout decisions are one of the
most studied subjects in the field of finance.
After the work of Miller and Modigliani (1961), many hypotheses and theories were developed to
explain the factors determining dividend payout decisions and the relationship between dividend
payout decisions and a company’s worth. It is not possible to discuss one existing common
result of these academic studies. Black (1976) identified this situation as the ‘dividend puzzle’, and
Brealey and Myers (2002) counted this puzzle among the top ten unsolved problems of finance.
Efforts are still being made to solve the aforementioned enigma regarding the dividend payout
with the aim of reaching more precise results using different methodologies and data. These studies are
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predominantly related to developed markets, although studies using data from developing markets
and international comparative studies are becoming more common.
In Turkey, being a candidate for the EU, many regulations including corporate governance
principals on companies and capital markets are put into practice so as to reduce gap Turkey and EU.
In 2003 corporate governance principals have entered in Turkey with the “comply or explain” approach
by imitating principals or codes from UK and OECD. In 2012 the “comply or explain” approach turned
in to the compliance rules. Similarly, many regulations from developed market including dividend
policy of corporation are amended in the Turkish Commercial Code of 2012. Given the importance of
new regulations in Turkey which are mainly adopted from developed market, it should be investigated
as to whether the empirical results are in line with developed market.
Although, dividend smoothing hypothesis Lintner (1956) is quoted widely by studies in this
field. There are very few studies which empirically test the hypothesis in the literature. To test the
effect of previous year’s dividend payout on the current year’s dividend payout requires an advanced
econometric analysis technique like dynamic panel regression that this study is utilized. By using
7 years of data from companies whose shares were traded on the Borsa Istanbul between 2009 and
2015, the company specific factors are analyzed which affects dividend payout decisions of listed
companies between 2010 and 2016. The size of the company, profitability, liquidity, age, shareholder
structure, debt ratio, market value to book value ratio and previous year’s dividend payout were
taken as the explanatory variables in the analysis. As in similar studies, dividend payout per share
is used as a dependent variable representing the dividend payout decision. However, this study
also considers dividend paid out as shares (stock dividends) alongside dividend paid out as cash
when calculating dividend payout per share; the first time, as far as we know, that this has been
done in a study of dividend payout decisions in Turkey. The second original aspect of this work
is related to the methodology used: the coefficients of the independent variables are estimated by
Arellano–Bover/Blundell-Bond, one of the dynamic panel data methods, two-step system generalized
method of moments (GMM) as it also used by Ahmed and Javid (2008); Maldajian and Khoury (2014)
and Patra et al. (2012).
According to the results of the two-step dynamic panel regression; the previous year’s dividend
payout per share, the company’s return on equity and the market value to book value ratio,
size in terms of market capitalization and the liquidity has positive effect on dividend payout;
while no statistically significant effect on dividend payout detected from age, family control or debt
ratio. The results show that the determinant of the dividend payout in Turkish stock market is not
different from developed markets. Therefore, the theories and the model are applicable for Turkey as
an example of emerging markets.
The emergence of a positive relationship between dividend payout and return on equity supports
the free cash flow hypothesis and the positive relationship with the previous year’s dividend payout
ratio supports the dividend smoothing hypothesis.
The next section of this study is a summary of the literature, the third section is an explanation of
the data set and methods, and the fourth section explains the empirical results. The fifth and final
section consists of conclusions and recommendations.
2. Literature Review
Before Miller and Modigliani (1961)’s paper, many economists thought that a company’s value
increases as dividend payout increases. Almost everyone agreed that a company must pay out
dividends for existential reasons and that the shares of high dividend companies should be sold at a
high price (Frankfurter and Wood 1997). The basis of this thinking depended on the assumption that
the current value of the company is a discounted form of the company’s future profits. Contrary to
this assumption, Miller and Modigliani (1961), suggest that the value of the company is not affected
by dividend payout; deciding to give the profit only as dividends or leave it within the company
as determined by the company’s investments with no change in investment policy has no effect on
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its own. Miller and Modigliani (1961)’s model’s result forms the basis of the discussions/study of
dividends over the past 50 years in the finance literature (Al-Malkawi et al. 2010).
Models and theories developed after that of Miller and Modigliani (1961), either implicitly or
explicitly, removing or relaxing the assumptions of the their model. Empirical and theoretic works on
the subject, for the most part, have tried to explain the reasons for the market imperfection related to
dividend payout that appeared due to asymmetric information, taxes, and transaction costs.
The first sets of asymmetric information-based models are the agency hypothesis, the pecking
order hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. The basics of the relationship between the agency
problem and dividend payout is based on the work of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986).
According to Easterbrook (1984), dividend payout reduces the agency cost. Because dividend payout
forces company managers to provide cash from the market, it means that the market actors must keep
a close eye on the company. The pecking order hypothesis, whose approach is the antithesis of the
agency hypothesis, is based on work by Donaldson (1961) and Myers and Majluf (1984). According to
this hypothesis, managers first prefer the internal sources, if the internal financing is not sufficient,
then managers would have to move to the external sources. To access the external funds, they will
issue debt. If issuing more debt is no longer practical to raise the funds, then issuing the equity is
the final option. The signaling hypothesis assumes that dividend payout decision has the effect of a
signal sent out from within the company when information is asymmetric. According to the signaling
hypothesis developed by Bhattacharya (1979), managers have more knowledge of the company’s
investments than those shareholders who are outside the company and use the company’s dividend
payout decisions as a means to convey this information to the outsider. In works that came after
Bhattacharya (1979), which see dividend payout as a means of providing information from inside the
company to the outside (John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 1985), the view is that the managers
on the inside have more information about the company’s future cash flow than outside investors or
partners and reflect this information in dividend payout decisions.
A second group of models emerge when the assumption, “there are no tax differentials either
between distributed and undistributed profits or between dividend and capital gain”, is removed from
the model by Miller and Modigliani (1961, p. 412). Indeed, dividend earnings are usually taxed more
than capital gains. It can be assumed that investors who faced with different tax rates would prefer to
reduce their tax burdens as much as possible. For example, according to the clientele effect hypothesis,
if the dividend yield is taxed more, investors who do not need cash tend to prefer companies that
do not pay out dividends rather than those that do, suggesting that investors in the other case tend to
prefer cash dividend paying companies. Hence, this explains the market response to changes in
dividend payout: when the dividend payout decision is changed, those investors who wish to reduce
their tax burden will rearrange their portfolios.
The third group of models have arisen with the loosening of the zero cost assumption of the
Miller and Modigliani (1961) model which assumes that shareholders do not make a distinction between
cash dividend and capital gain because they can obtain cash when they need it by selling the
shares they hold, on the market without any cost. However, trading on the market is not cost-free,
shareholders face concealed or unconcealed costs when they are trading. Transaction costs are the
expenses incurred during the purchase or sale of shares (commission fees, etc.). In some cases,
a lack of depth/liquidity in the market has the effect of lowering the price of large quantity sales
(Papadopoulos and Charalambidis 2007).
Another area where transaction costs affect the dividend payout is the cost of the issuing of new
shares to meet the company’s financing needs. If the cost of providing external financing for companies
is high, they have a higher tendency to leave their earnings within the company. In this case there
will be a negative relationship between dividend payout and transaction costs. However, in practice,
companies often pay out dividends on the one hand, while on the other hand issuing new shares and
borrowing because other factors affecting dividend payout are dominant (Al-Malkawi et al. 2010).
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On the other hand, Easterbrook (1984) argues that if the company’s cash position is insufficient for
cash dividend, the need for cash will be met from the market, which will be reflected as an extra cost to
the company paying out dividends. Even if there is no transaction cost for shareholders, cash dividend
payout comes at a cost to the company. Since this cost will reduce the amount of profit and therefore,
negatively affect the value of share, the effect of the transaction costs on the dividend is not clear.
In empirical studies, it has been shown that transaction costs have little effect on dividend decisions
(DeAngelo et al. 2009).
According to the Lintner (1956) model, which accepted as the first empirical study on dividend
payout, managers are reluctant to change the level of dividend payout, and unwilling to increase
their dividend payout ratios even if the profit performance is very high. They only increased the
dividend payout ratio if they think this ratio to be sustainable in the future. Future profit forecasts
are currently one of the most effective factors for dividend payout decisions. Similarly, managers are
extremely reluctant to reduce dividend payout and will only reduce the dividend payout if they think
the unfavorable conditions will only be very short term.
In the Lintner (1956) model, the dividend payments are a function of current period profit,
past dividend payments, the target dividend payout ratio of the company, and the rate of approach of
the current dividend payments to the target dividend amount. According to this model, the past
dividend payout ratio along with the current period’s profit are the most important determiners of the
dividend payout ratio. Lintner (1956) observed that companies increased their dividend payout ratios
and were reluctant to reduce them when they predicted a sustainable growth in future cash flows.
This is called the “dividend smoothing hypothesis” (Baker 2009).
According to the bird in hand theory laid out in the background of Gordon (1959, 1963) and
Walter (1963)’s work, in a world of uncertainty and information asymmetry investors prefer the present
earnings (bird in hand), dividend payments, to future earnings (two birds in the bush), capital gains.
For this reason, when everything else is constant, more dividend payout increases the market price of
the company, in other words, it increases the value of the company. The high dividend payout share
today reduces the cost of the capital, thereby reducing the uncertainty about the future and thus
increases the value of the share. The current high dividend payout removes uncertainty about future
cash flows, reduces cost of capital and increases the value of the company (Al-Malkawi et al. 2010).
Miller and Modigliani (1961) criticize this approach, suggesting that the company is fundamentally
driven by its cash flows, not by the way it distributes its earnings. Bhattacharya (1979) describes the bird
in hand theory as an illusion and suggests that a company’s cash flow risk will affect that company’s
dividend payments but not decrease the risk by increasing dividend payments. A company’s cash
flows are reflected to its dividend payments. Increasing dividend payments alone cannot reduce
the company’s risk. As the company’s risk increases, dividend payouts can be expected to decline.
Increasing the dividend payouts does not have a diminishing effect on a company’s risk.
Grullon et al. (2002) developed the “maturity hypothesis” which argues that as companies
mature, their investment/growth opportunities diminish, and as a result the expectations for return
on their investments will fall. As the expected of return declines, companies distribute cash from
their previous investments to their shareholders as dividends rather than turning them into new
investments. Therefore, a feature of mature companies is a higher rate of dividend payout. According to
this hypothesis, dividend payout yields two pieces of information: First, the systematic risk of the
company is reduced. Second, the company’s investment opportunities have narrowed, and in the
future, it cannot make high investments. If the market shows a positive response to the dividend news,
it means that the market prefers reduced risk to reduced profit.
The study of Javakhadze et al. (2014) show that Lintner (1956) dividend smoothing model works
internationally, but with cross-sectional differences. Andres et al. (2015) also found partial adjustment
in dividend is valid in both dividends and total payouts. Notwithstanding the small number of
empirical studies which support the irrelevance hypothesis (Bernstein 1996; Black and Scholes 1974;
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Miller and Rock 1985), there are a number of studies showing that the dividend payout decisions of
the company are influential on share prices (Al-Malkawi et al. 2010; Kadioglu et al. 2015).
In testing signaling hypothesis, Benartzi et al. (1997) did not come across any meaningful
evidence that changes in the dividends provided any information related to future profitability.
Kadioglu and Öcal (2016), working in Turkey, reached a similar result. Pettit (1977) and Baker and
Wurgler (2004)’s studies reached results which support the clientele effect hypothesis. In Lasfer (1996)’s
analysis he found that companies that pay out more cash dividends are preferred by investors in the
lower income group.
Apart from theoretical studies, there are several empirical studies that generally investigate the
factors affecting dividend payout at the company level.
Table 1 below summarizes results of some empirical studies which aim to find out effect of
internal factors on dividend payout. The +/− signs in the table shows positive or negative effect of the
internal factor like debt, liquidity, shareholder structure (controlled by a family or not), maturity (age),
market value/book value ratio, profitability, size, the previous year’s dividend payout and current
dividend payout.
Table 1. Effect of Internal Factors on Dividend Payout (Empirical Studies).
Study Debt
Ratio
Liquid. Ownership
Mat.
(Age)
MV/BV
Ratio
Pre.
Div. Prof. SizeFam. Non-Fam.
Ahmed and Javid (2008)—Pakistan - + +
Al-Ajmi and Hussain (2011)–S. Arabia + + +
Alam and Hossain (2012) + +
Al-Kuwari (2009)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and UAE - + +
Al-Malkawi et al. (2010)—Jordan - + + +
Al-Shubiri (2011)—Oman - + +
Amidu and Abor (2006)—Ghana + - +
Brawn and Ševic´ (2018)—US + +
Denis and Osobov (2008)—USA, Canada, UK,
Germany, France and Japan +
Duygun et al. (2018)—Indonesia -
Griffin (2010)—International -
Kumar and Waheed (2014)—UAE +
Maldajian and Khoury (2014)—Lebanon + - +
Agyei and Marfo-Yiadom (2011)—Ghana - +
Nnadi et al. (2013)—29 African Countries -
Papadopoulos and Charalambidis (2007)—Greece +
Patra et al. (2012)—Greece - + + +
Rehman and Takumi (2012)—Pakistan + +
Vo and Nguyen (2014)—Vietnam -
As seen from Table 1, empirical studies found a negative relationship between dividend payout
and level of debt. Firms that have higher debts, payout lower dividend since earnings paid for debt
servicing. The profitability, liquidity and size mainly affect the dividend payout positively. Firms
that have higher profits, liquidity and bigger size, payout more dividends. Some of the studies found
that family-owned companies pay lower dividend and previous years’ dividend payout positively
influence current dividend payout.
The studies on Turkish stock market takes in to account only cash dividend and many of them
used data of companies which are prepared their financial statements according to Turkish accounting
standards and data of regulated period (listed companies must distribute a fraction of their earnings
as a dividend up to 2008). Adaoglu (2008) analyzed whether dividend payout is declining over
time and the effect of the size on dividend payout using the data containing period of 1986–2007.
He found that dividend payout decreased over time and bigger firm distributes more dividends.
Ersoy and Çetenak (2015) investigated the impact of ownership concentration on the dividend payout
policy by using data set data for the period from 2004 to 2009 and found the higher debt financing
and market value to book value ratio effect the dividend payout negatively, whereas the higher profit
lead the higher dividend payout. Kuzucu (2015) and Yıldız et al. (2014) analyzed the firm-specific
factors affecting the dividend decisions and they both used panel data for the period from 2006 to 2013
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and from 2003 to 2010 respectively by utilizing panel regression. His finding confirms the result of
Duygun et al. (2018) and Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016), and he also found the size and age positively
affect the dividend payout. Yıldız et al. (2014) found liquidity, size and profitability have a positive
impact on the dividend payout.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data
The data from 2009 to 2015 was used to analyze the dividend payout decisions of companies
whose shares were traded on the Borsa Istanbul stock exchange between 2010 and 2016. Since the
financial statements of the listed companies in Borsa Istanbul are fully compatible with IFRS after 2009,
the sample covering period from 2009 to 2015 is selected to be compatible with other international
studies, besides, mandatory dividend regulations abolished by Turkish capital market authority
starting from 2009. The following variables, which are considered to affect dividend payout decisions,
have been obtained from the companies’ yearly financial statements prepared via independent auditing
in accordance with the IFRS (dated December 31st) and acquired with the help of the Finnet Financial
Analysis program. The data related to the companies, which was not included in the financial
statements (i.e., year founded, ownership structure, etc.), was taken from the Public Disclosure
Platform (www.kap.org.tr) and the companies’ websites; while the information related to dividend
payout amounts made in the form of cash and shares was retrieved from Is Yatirim Menkul Degerler
A.S. (www.isyatirim.com.tr).
The average number of companies whose shares were listed on the Borsa Istanbul between 2010
and 2016 is 389. Just as in previous similar work (Adaoglu 2008; Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan 2016;
Sayılgan et al. 2006), financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, factoring and leasing
companies, brokerage houses, securities investment trusts) whose investment and dividend payout
decisions are subject to different regulatory provisions from other companies. Additionally, companies
that have paid out dividends for less than three years in whole period have been excluded from the
sample. After these exclusions, the remaining sample sets of the observations consist of 94 companies
for 2009, 96 for 2010, 100 for 2011, 103 for 2012, 111 for 2013, 117 for 2014, 117 for 2015 and 115 for 2016.
There is a total of 853 (an average of 106) companies observed during the years in question.
3.2. Variables and Descriptive Statistics
The dividend payout per share is used as a dependent variable in the study to represent the
dividend payout decision.
When calculating the dividend payout ratio in previous studies, it seems that dividend payout
only as cash was considered. In this study, taking dividend payout as cash into account along with
cash increase through stock dividend (the following dependent variable was calculated1):
Dividend Payout (Cash + Stock)Per Share =
Cash Div. + Stock Div. ∗ Price o f Share
Paid in Capital
1 Price of share in the formula 1 is the market price at the dividend payment date.
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In our study, there are eight factors which were considered to affect the dividend payout and
constitute the independent variables in the model. The independent variable data is calculated as:
Size (RCAP)2 = 1 Billion × (Market Capitalization)−1
Profitability (PRO) = Net Profit/Equity
Liquidity (LIQU) = Liquid Assets/Short Term Liabilities
Maturity (AGE) = Year of Financial Report–Year of Founding of Company
Equity Structure = If the company is under family control3 FAM = 1, If not FAM = 0
Debt (DEBT) = Short and Long-Term Liabilities/Total Assets
MV/BV (MV) = Market Value/Book Value calculated as of 31/12
Pre. Div. Payout (DPSt−1) = The previous year’s dividend payout per share
The variable related summary descriptive statistics that will be used in this study are shown on
Table 2 below.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables.
Variable N Average St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
DPS 853 1.8162 12.1190 0.0000 288.7700
RCAP 853 2.0755 4.8134 0.0018 44.9644
PRO 853 0.1281 0.1302 −0.5970 0.8944
LIQU 853 2.3043 12.3775 0.0003 259.3688
AGE 853 36.3939 16.3584 2.0000 105.0000
FAM 853 0.5393 0.4987 0.0000 1.0000
DEBT 853 0.4008 0.2190 0.0028 0.9091
MV 853 1.8855 2.2522 0.2319 22.3732
To see the magnitude of co-movement between variables, the correlation matrix is established in
Table 3 below.
Table 3. Correlation Matrix between Variables.
Variable DPS RCAP PRO LIQU AGE FAM DEBT MV
DPS 1
RCAP −0.0564 1
PRO 0.0821 −0.2185 1
LIQU −0.0156 −0.0185 −0.036 1
AGE 0.0177 −0.2493 −0.0228 −0.0404 1
FAM −0.0031 0.1092 0.027 0.0893 −0.1623 1
DEBT 0.0089 −0.004 −0.0056 −0.2642 −0.0461 0.0883 1
MV 0.0741 −0.1237 0.3696 −0.0471 0.0254 −0.0214 0.1238 1
As seen from Table 3, the correlation coefficients between the variables are low. It appears that the
maximum correlation is between the MV variable and the PRO variable (0.37).
3 Family control is defined as a family having a control over the company (through majority of the share or privileged shares
which confer control) either directly or indirectly (through other companies).
2 In order to improve the regression’s appearance and to facilitate interpretation, the mathematical inverse of the market
capitalization variable used to represent the sizes of the companies was taken and multiplied by one billion as in studies by
Okumus¸ (2002) and Günalp and Çelik (2004). Therefore, the results of this variable should be interpreted accordingly.
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3.3. Methodology
The following equation is applied to analyze the factors affecting the dividend payout decisions of
companies. It aims to estimate the independent variables’ effect on dividend payout per share as cash
along with dividend payout in the form of shares (DPS).
DPS i,t = α+ β1DPSi,t−1 + β2RCAPi,t + β3PROi,t + β4LIQUi,t + β5 AGEi,t + β6FAMi
+β7DEBTi,t + β8MVi,t + ηi + εi,t
(1)
The dependent variable DPS i,t of the equation shows the cash per share + stock dividend payout
per share in year t of firm i. RCAPi,t shows the mathematical inverse of firm i’s market capitalization
in year t, PROi,t shows firm i’s return on equity in year t, LIQUi,t shows firm i’s liquidity ratio in year
t, AGEi,t shows firm i’s age in year t, FAMi represents a dummy variable indicating whether the firm
i is controlled by a family, DEBTi,t shows firm i’s debt ratio in year t, MVi,t shows firm i’s market
value/book value in year t, ηi shows unobservable firm effects, εi,t shows the effect of unobservable
cross section variables changing over time.
As in the above equation, models in which a lagged dependent variable (DPSi,t−1) is included as
an independent variable are called dynamic models and these models are generally expressed in the
form of the following equation (Güngör and Kaygın 2015):
Yi,t = dYi,t−1 + βX′i,t + ui,t
i = 1, . . . ., N t = 1, . . . ., T
ui,t = vi,t + µi
(2)
In this model µi for the ith observation, since it is independent from t as a constant (or in other
words since µi doesn’t change over time) is included in the model both as the dependent variable (Yi,t)
as well as the model’s the explanatory variable which is the lagged value (Yi,t−1), is a function of µi.
Because of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term, the least square
estimates are biased (Greene 2003).
Dynamic panel data models are divided into two types (Greene 2003; Tatog˘lu 2013): autoregressive
panel data models in which the lagged values of the dependent variable are included as independent
variables, and distributed lag panel data models in which the lagged values of the independent
variables are included as independent variables. Arellano and Bond (1991) developed the Difference
GMM method of dynamic panel estimation in order to solve the problems in auto-regressive models
(Arı and Özcan 2011). Since the lagged values of the independent variables are used as an instrumental
variable by taking the first differences of the variables in the development of this method, it’s called
the Difference GMM (Dökmen 2012). However, in the case of unbalanced panel data or when T is
small, there is data loss in the first difference transformation. For example, if there is no data for
Yit, the data for ∆Yit and ∆Yit−1 will be lost in the first difference transformation. Because of these
problems, Arellano and Bover (1995)’s Difference GMM, an effective instrumental variable estimator,
was developed using the Orthogonal Deviations Method. With this method, the difference between
the current period and the previous period is not counted; instead the average of the future values of
the variable is used. In this way, the data loss caused by the Difference GMM, especially in data sets
which are especially unbalanced, is minimized. This method, which establishes equality between an
original system and a transformed system and estimates them as one system together, is known as
System GMM (Tatog˘lu 2013). System GMM is based on combining the difference equation and the
level equation and it has been proven that it has a proportionally higher estimation ability than the
GMM (Dökmen 2012).
The estimation method of Arellano–Bover/Blundell-Bond, one of the system’s GMM methods,
two-step system GMM estimator for estimation in our equation is used. Considering that the panel
data set is unbalanced and that T is low with the algorithm developed by Roodman (2006).
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4. Empirical Results
In econometric analyses, the time series, the average and variance of which do not change over
time, and also the covariance of which depends on the distance between the two periods only and
not on the period of calculation, are called stationary series. In the System GMM Estimator, analysis
is done under the assumption that the data are stationary. However, it is known that sometimes the
data, including the panel data, are not stationary. If data is not stationary, the regression results may
be spurious. In some cases, even dependent and independent variable are unrelated, it is possible
to find a relationship between dependent and independent variables with high R2. For this reason,
in order to understand the series’ tendency, it is necessary to find the regression with the values of the
previous period in the value of every series. One of the best known and most commonly used unit
root tests is Dickey–Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller 1979). It is grounded on the model of the first-order
autoregressive process (Box and Jenkins 1970):
yt = ∅1yt−1 + εt t = 1, . . . , T (3)
where ∅1 is the autoregression parameter, εt is the non-systematic component of the model that meets
the characteristics of the random walk process. The null hypothesis is H0 : ∅1 = 1 which means that
that the process contains a unit root and consequently it is non-stationary, alternative hypothesis is
H0 : |∅1| < 1 which means that the process does not contain a unit root and is stationary.
After the model was established it was determined that all panel variables were stationary with
the ADF-Fisher Chi-Square (Dickey and Fuller 1979); Im, Pesaran and Shin W (Im et al. 2003); Levin,
Lin and Chu (Levin et al. 2002) and PP-Fisher Chi-Square (Phillips and Perron 1988) tests. Table 4
shows the results of the unit root tests applied to the variables at once.
Table 4. Results of Unit Root Tests Applied to the Variables.
Levin, Lin & Chu t Im, Pesaran andShin W
ADF-Fisher
Chi-Square
PP-Fisher Chi
Square
Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.
DPS −32.5045 0.000 −12.6831 0.000 522.653 0.000 643.941 0.000
RCAP −65.2300 0.000 −20.1040 0.000 598.048 0.000 468.869 0.000
PRO −35.8009 0.000 −8.73764 0.000 413.820 0.000 445.834 0.000
LIQU −30.5018 0.000 −8.52122 0.000 424.381 0.000 430.383 0.000
DEBT −48.8429 0.000 −6.68839 0.000 348.622 0.000 344.175 0.000
MV −25.8335 0.000 −6.72648 0.000 384.629 0.000 401.920 0.000
Note: If the probability value is less than 10%, “H0: variable has unit root” is rejected. In other words, the variable
is stationary.
As seen from Table 4, according to the four different unit root test statistics results, all of the
variables used in the study are stationary. Therefore, according to these results, the stationary
assumption required for the regression analysis is not violated.
As seen in the model, one of the explanatory variables (DPSi,t−1) which is the lagged of
the dependent variable (DPSi,t). Many studies including Baltagi (2008), Greene (2003) and
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) argue that dynamic panel data analysis should be utilized if the lagged of
the dependent variable used as an explanatory variable in the model in order to estimate unbiased and
consistent estimators.
Taking into consideration the arguments of Baltagi (2008), Greene (2003) and
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) a dynamic panel estimation is used4. The results of the regression
4 Although this paper mainly focused on dynamic panel regression, pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is carried
out additionally. According to OLS regression results, the model is insignificant overall. The results of Maximum Likelihood
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using Arellano–Bover/Blundell-Bond two-step system GMM Estimator and the results are presented
in the table below.
In Table 5, the test results provide information about consistency of the dynamic panel regression
estimates. The Wald test is used to test the overall explanatory power of independent variables on the
dependent variable, the Sargan and the Hansen tests reveal whether the instrumental variables are
valid, and the Arellano–Bond (AB) test is applied to detect the presence of the autocorrelation problem
in the model.
Table 5. Two Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Regression Results.
Variable Coefficient St. Dev. z
DPSt−1 0.0162 *** 0.0010 15.39
RCAP −3.2348 ** 1.4464 −2.24
PRO 18.9507 *** 1.5120 12.53
LIQU 0.1227 * 0.0689 1.78
AGE 0.0060 0.0285 0.21
FAM 0.1501 2.4267 0.06
DEBT −5.6688 3.5416 −1.60
MV 0.3810 *** 0.0592 6.44
Wald-Statistics chi2(8) = 1164.79 P > chi2 = 0.000
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) z = −1.19 P > z = 0.236
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) z = 0.06 P > z = 0.951
Instrumentals for First Difference Equality: D. (PRO. LIQU)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions chi2(21) = 25.72 P > chi2 = 0.217
Hansen test of overid. restrictions chi2(21) = 21.83 P > chi2 = 0.410
GMM Instrument Levels
Hansen test excluding group chi2(15) = 16.15 P > chi2 = 0.372
Difference (H0 = exogenous) chi2(6) = 5.68 P > chi2 = 0.460
iv (PRO LIQU)
Hansen test excluding group chi2(19) = 20.57 P > chi2 = 0.361
Difference (H0 = exogenous) chi2(2) = 1.26 P > chi2 = 0.534
Note: *** shows 1% significance level, ** shows 5% significance level and * shows 10% significance level.
The Wald test’s hypotheses are:
H0 = The independent variable has no explanatory power for the dependent variable.
H1 = The independent variable has explanatory power for the dependent variable.
The H0 hypothesis was rejected by Wald statistic’s (p < 0.05), so the independent variables have
explanatory power for the dependent variables and the whole model was concluded to be significant.
The Arellano–Bond test is employed to detect the autocorrelation problem in two-step system
GMM regressions.
The Arellano–Bond test’s hypotheses are:
H0 = There is no autocorrelation.
H1 = There is autocorrelation.
The presence of 1st degree and 2nd degree autocorrelation was tested: The AR(1) test came out
statistically negative and insignificant, the AR(2) test came out positive and insignificant. Therefore,
LR test results propose the pooled OLS regression over panel regression. The results of the pooled OLS regression show that
estimation model is not correct. Additionally, Hausman test is applied to two-step system GMM and the test also favored
two-step system GMM estimation over OLS.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 93 11 of 16
the H0 hypothesis cannot be rejected for either equation. According to these findings, the conclusion
was reached that there is no first- or second-degree autocorrelation. For the Generalized Moments
Estimator to be effective, it is sufficient that there be no second degree autocorrelation (Tatog˘lu 2013).
In the two-step system GMM dynamic panel regression, the Sargan (not robust) and Hansen
(robust) tests as well as the over identifying restrictions validity test were performed to evaluate the
validity of the instrumental variables. These Sargan test’s hypotheses are:
H0 = The over identifying restrictions are valid for the instrumental variable.
H1 = The over identifying restrictions are invalid for the instrumental variable.
The robust Difference-Hansen test’s hypotheses are:
H0 = The instrumental variables are exogenous.
H1 = The instrumental variables are not exogenous.
According to both the Sargan (not robust) and the Hansen (robust) tests in the regression, the H0
hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, the over identifying restrictions are valid. Again according to
the robust Difference-Hansen test results, the instrumental variables used as instrumentals are valid
and the H0 hypothesis level and GMM equalities cannot be rejected (Tatog˘lu 2013).
As a result, the regressions that reveal the elements affecting the dividend payout decisions
provide for the entirety of the conditions related to general significance, autocorrelation, and the
instrumental variables.
When the dynamic panel regression results shown in Table 5 are examined on the basis of the
independent variable the previous year’s dividend payout (DPSt−1), the company’s size (RCAP),
the return on equity (PRO), the liquidity (LIQU), and the market value/book value ratio (MV) are
observed to have statistically significant with regards to their effect on the dependent variable included
in the equation as DPS, cash/bonus dividend payout per share while the variables AGE, FAM, and
DEBT were not observed to have any statistically significant effect on dividend payout when shares
given as a dividend were taken into account.
In our regression equation, the size of the company (RCAP) is represented by the mathematical
inverse of market capitalization [(1 billion ×Market Capitalization)−1]. If there is a positive relationship
between company size and dividend payout, it is expected that the correlation will be negative
in the regression results as the indicator is its mathematical inverse. According to the regression
results in Table 5, since the coefficient is observed to have a negative sign, therefore there is a 5%
positive correlation between company size and the dividend payout. According to the results, the
one-tailed null hypothesis formulated as “H0 = there is no positive relationship between company size and
dividend payout” is rejected since the z-statistic value (−2.24) is smaller than critical z value (−1.645)
for α = 0.05, and therefore the hypothesis H1 is accepted. As a result, the size of company has
a positive effect on the dividend payout. The conclusion reached is in line with previous works
(Adaoglu 2008; Al-Kuwari 2009; Al-Malkawi et al. 2010; Denis and Osobov 2008; Fama and French 2001;
Jensen et al. 1992; Kuzucu 2015; Yıldız et al. 2014) which conclude that there is a positive relationship
between size of company and dividend payout.
In the regression equation, the variable indicating return on equity shown as PRO is
positive as expected. The company’s return on equity has a significant effect on the dividend
payout at the 1% significance level. According to these results, as the return on the equity
increases, the dividends paid out by the companies also increase. This finding supports the
free cash flow hypothesis developed by Jensen (1986) and is consistent with other studies in
the literature (Ahmed and Javid 2008; Al-Ajmi and Hussain 2011; Al-Kuwari 2009; Al-Shubiri 2011;
Ersoy and Çetenak 2015; Marfo-Yiadom and Agyei 2011; Patra et al. 2012) that found a positive
relationship between profitability and dividend payout.
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The company’s liquidity was represented by the ratio of Liquid Assets/Short-Term Liabilities. In
the regression equation, the independent variable indicating liquidity shown by LIQU is positive as
expected, and the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable has a
10% level of statistical significance. In other words, the result that the liquidity has a positive effect on
the dividend payout ratio is in line with the study conducted by Yıldız et al. (2014) on the companies
listed on the Borsa Istanbul.
The company’s age, shown in the regression equations as AGE was not shown to have a statistically
significant effect in relation to the dividend payout. For this reason, it is concluded that the company’s
age does not influence the dividend payout. The dummy variable FAM is used to test the hypothesis
developed about the shareholder structure of the company and has a value of 1 if the company is
controlled by a family, and 0 if not. According to the regression results in Table 5, the shareholder
structure of the company has no effect on dividend payout.
Even though the coefficient of the independent variable shown as DEBT in the regression equation
is negative, the effect of the company’s debt ratio on dividend payout is not statistically significant. The
market value/book value ratio, shown as MV, which represents growth opportunities of a company,
has a positive significant effect on dividend payout at the 1% significance level.
In the regression, the coefficient of the previous year’s dividend payout variable, as shown as
DPSt−1, is positive, as expected, and has a 1% statistically significant effect. According to the result,
the one-tailed null hypothesis formulated as “H0 = there is no positive relationship between current period
dividend payout and the previous year’s dividend payout” is rejected because the z-statistic value (15.34) is
greater than the critical z value (2.33) for (α = 0.01), and therefore the alternative hypothesis is accepted.
In other words, as the previous year’s dividend payout per share increases, the company’s current
period dividend payout as cash and/or bonus also increases. This conclusion supports Lintner (1956)’s
hypothesis and is in line with studies (Al-Ajmi and Hussain 2011; Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan 2017;
Al-Najjar 2009; Maldajian and Khoury 2014; Omet 2004) showing that the previous year’s dividend
payout ratio has a positive effect on the current period’s ratio.
5. Conclusions
It can be said that decisions about how much of the end-of-period profit will be retained in the
company and how much will be paid out to the shareholders have been made for about 400 years,
since chartered companies emerged at the beginning of the 17th century. However, until the mid-20th
century, there was general consensus that high ratio dividend had a positive impact on the value of
the company (Frankfurter and Wood 1997). Miller and Modigliani (1961), with some simplifying
assumptions, proposed that the value of the company (the share price) is not affected by the dividend
payout decision or paying out more dividend will not necessarily increase the value of the company.
Besides theoretical studies on dividend payout and empirical test of the hypotheses, many studies
examine the factors affecting dividend payout at the company level.
In this study, 7 years of company data (2009–2015) was used to analyze the firm-specific factors
affecting the dividend payout decisions of companies whose shares were traded on the Borsa Istanbul
stock exchange between 2010 and 2016. The size of the company, profitability, liquidity, age, shareholder
structure, debt ratio, market value to book value ratio and the previous year’s dividend payout are
taken as explanatory variables in the analysis. As a dependent variable, dividend paid out as shares
(stock dividends) alongside dividend paid out as a cash are used jointly when calculating dividend
payout per share.
According to the results of the dynamic panel regression; while the previous year’s dividend
payout per share (cash + stock dividend), return on equity, the market value to book value ratio,
size (market capitalization), and the liquidity has a significant positive effect on dividend payout;
there is no statistically significant relationship between the dividend payout and age, family control or
debt ratio.
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Looking at the results of the regression, dividends paid out as cash and/or stocks are observed to
be affected by the previous year’s dividend payout. This situation shows that companies traded on
the Borsa Istanbul have a target dividend payout ratio, like those on the New York Stock Exchange
(Baker and Powell 2000), this rate hasn’t changed much over the years, and they behave in a manner
which support’s Lintner (1956)’s dividend smoothing hypothesis.
In similar studies in the future, the development of different explanatory variables that may have
an impact on dividend payout decisions, or the calculation of different proxies for variables which
already exist in the literature, can help estimate of company’s actions. In addition, the undertaking of
similar studies using different samples from those used in this study (e.g., a sample including only
banks and other financial institutions or companies that don’t distribute any dividends at all) would
contribute to the overall study of dividend payout decisions.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, F.B., E.K. and G.S.; Methodology, F.B. and E.K.; Validation, F.B.; Formal
analysis, F.B. and E.K.; Data curation, E.K.; Writing—original draft preparation, F.B. and E.K.; Writing—review
and editing, F.B. and E.K.; Supervision, G.S.; project administration, E.K.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
Adaoglu, Cahit. 2008. Dividend Policy of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) Industrial Corporations: The Evidence
Revisited (1986–2007). Journal of BRSA Banking and Financial Markets 2: 113–35.
Agyei, Samuel Kwaku, and Edward Marfo-Yiadom. 2011. Dividend Policy and Bank Performance in Ghana.
International Journal of Economics and Finance 3: 202–7. [CrossRef]
Ahmed, Hafeez, and Attiya Yasmin Javid. 2008. Dynamics and Determinants of Dividend Policy in Pakistan
(Evidence from Karachi Stock Exchange Non-Financial Listed Firms). International Research Journal of Finance
and Economics 25: 148–71.
Al-Ajmi, Jasim, and Hameeda Abo Hussain. 2011. Corporate Dividends Decisions: Evidence from Saudi Arabia.
The Journal of Risk Finance 12: 41–56. [CrossRef]
Alam, Md. Zahangir, and Mohammad Emdad Hossain. 2012. Dividend Policy: A Comparative Study of UK and
Bangladesh Based Companies. IOSR Journal of Business and Management 1: 57–67. [CrossRef]
Al-Kuwari, Duha. 2009. Determinants of the Dividend Policy of Companies Listed on Emerging Stock Exchanges:
The Case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries. Global Economy & Finance Journal 2: 38–63.
Al-Malkawi, Husam-Aldin Nizar, Michael Rafferty, and Rekha Pillai. 2010. Dividend Policy: A Review of Theories
and Empirical Evidence. International Bulletin of Business Administration 9: 171–200.
Al-Najjar, Basil. 2009. Dividend Behaviour and Smoothing New Evidence from Jordanian Panel Data. Studies in
Economics and Finance 26: 182–97. [CrossRef]
Al-Najjar, Basil, and Erhan Kilincarslan. 2016. The Effect of Ownership Structure on Dividend Policy: Evidence
from Turkey. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 16: 135–61. [CrossRef]
Al-Najjar, Basil, and Erhan Kilincarslan. 2017. Corporate Dividend Decisions and Dividend Smoothing: New
Evidence from an Empirical Study of Turkish Firms. International Journal of Managerial Finance 13: 304–31.
[CrossRef]
Al-Shubiri, Faris Nasif. 2011. Determinants of Changes Dividend Behavior Policy: Evidence from the Amman
Stock Exchange. Far East Journal of Psychology and Business 4: 1–15.
Amidu, Mohammed, and Joshua Abor. 2006. Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios in Ghana. The Journal of
Risk Finance 7: 136–45. [CrossRef]
Anderson, Theodore Wilbur, and Cheng Hsiao. 1981. Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 76: 598–606. [CrossRef]
Andres, Christian, Markus Doumet, Erik Fernau, and Erik Theissen. 2015. The Lintner Model Revisited: Dividends
Versus Total Payouts. Journal of Banking & Finance 55: 56–69. [CrossRef]
Arellano, Manuel, and Stephen Bond. 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and
an Application to Employment Equations. The Review of Economic Studies 58: 277–97. [CrossRef]
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 93 14 of 16
Arellano, Manuel, and Olympia Bover. 1995. Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of
Error-Components Models. Journal of Econometrics 68: 29–51. [CrossRef]
Arı, Ays¸e, and Burcu Özcan. 2011. I˙s¸çi Gelirleri Ve Ekonomik Büyüme Ilis¸kisi: Dinamik Panel Veri Analizi.
Erciyes Üniversitesi I˙ktisadi ve I˙dari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 38: 101–17.
Baker, Kent H. 2009. Dividends and Dividend Policy. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Baker, Kent H., and Gary E. Powell. 2000. Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Survey of Nyse Firms.
Financial Practice and Education 10: 29–40.
Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler. 2004. A Catering Theory of Dividends. The Journal of Finance 59: 1125–65.
[CrossRef]
Baltagi, Badi. 2008. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Benartzi, Shlomo, Roni Michaely, and Richard Thaler. 1997. Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the
Past? The Journal of Finance 52: 1007–34. [CrossRef]
Bernstein, Peter L. 1996. Dividends: Thepuzzle. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9: 16–22. [CrossRef]
Bhattacharya, Sudipto. 1979. Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and “the Bird in the Hand” Fallacy. The Bell
Journal of Economics 10: 259–70. [CrossRef]
Black, Fischer. 1976. The Dividend Puzzle. The Journal of Portfolio Management 2: 5–8. [CrossRef]
Black, Fischer, and Myron Scholes. 1974. The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock
Prices and Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 1: 1–22. [CrossRef]
Box, George, and Gwilym Jenkins. 1970. Time Series Analysis-Forecasting and Control. San Francisco: Holden Day,
553p.
Brawn, Derek A., and Aleksandar Ševic´. 2018. Firm size matters: Industry sector, firm age and volatility do too
in determining which publicly-listed US firms pay a dividend. International Review of Financial Analysis 58:
132–52. [CrossRef]
Brealey, Richard A., and Stewart C. Myers. 2002. Principles of Corporate Finance. Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill
Education.
DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo, and Douglas J. Skinner. 2009. Corporate Payout Policy. Foundations and
Trends® in Finance 3: 95–287. [CrossRef]
Denis, David J., and Igor Osobov. 2008. Why Do Firms Pay Dividends? International Evidence on the
Determinants of Dividend Policy. Journal of Financial Economics 89: 62–82. [CrossRef]
Dickey, David A., and Wayne A. Fuller. 1979. Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with a
Unit Root. Journal of the American statistical association 74: 427–31. [CrossRef]
Dökmen, Gökhan. 2012. Yolsuzlukların Vergi Gelirleri Üzerindeki Etkisi: Dinamik Panel Veri Analizi.
Dog˘us¸ Üniversitesi Dergisi 13: 41–51.
Donaldson, Gordon. 1961. Corporate Debt Capacity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Duygun, Meryem, Yilmaz Guney, and Abdul Moin. 2018. Dividend policy of Indonesian listed firms: The role of
families and the state. Economic Modelling. [CrossRef]
Easterbrook, Frank H. 1984. Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends. American Economic Review 74: 650–59.
[CrossRef]
Ersoy, Ersan, and Emin Hüseyin Çetenak. 2015. Sahiplik Yogunlasmasinin Temettü Dagitim Kararlarina Etkisi:
Borsa Istanbul’da Bir Uygulama/the Impact of Ownership Concentration on Dividend Payout Policy:
Evidence from Turkey. Ege Akademik Bakis 15: 509–21. [CrossRef]
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 2001. Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower
Propensity to Pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60: 3–43. [CrossRef]
Frankfurter, George M., and Bob G. Wood Jr. 1997. The Evolution of Corporate Dividend Policy. Journal of Financial
Education 23: 16–33.
Gordon, Myron J. 1959. Dividends, Earnings, and Stock Prices. The Review of Economics and Statistics 41: 99–105.
[CrossRef]
Gordon, Myron J. 1963. Optimal Investment and Financing Policy. The Journal of Finance 18: 264–72.
Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric Analysis. Delhi: Pearson Education India.
Griffin, Carroll Howard. 2010. Liquidity and Dividend Policy: I˙nternational Evidence. International Business
Research 3: 3–9. [CrossRef]
Grullon, Gustavo, Roni Michaely, and Bhaskaran Swaminathan. 2002. Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm
Maturity? The Journal of Business 75: 387–424. [CrossRef]
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 93 15 of 16
Günalp, Burak, and Tuncay Çelik. 2004. Türk Bankacılık Sektöründe Piyasa Yapısı Ve Performans I˙lis¸kilerinin
Etkinlik I˙çin Dog˘rudan Bir Ölçüt Kullanılarak Test Edilmesi. Gazi Üniversitesi I˙ktisadi ve I˙dari Bilimler Fakültesi
Dergisi 6: 1–27.
Güngör, Bener, and Ceyda Yerdelen Kaygın. 2015. Dinamik Panel Veri Analizi Ile Hisse Senedi Fiyatini Etkileyen
Faktörlerin Belirlenmesi. Kafkas Üniversitesi I˙ktisadi ve I˙dari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 6: 149–68. [CrossRef]
Im, Kyung So, M.Hashem Pesaran, and Yongcheol Shin. 2003. Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels.
Journal of econometrics 115: 53–74. [CrossRef]
Javakhadze, David, Stephen P. Ferris, and Nilanjan Sen. 2014. An International Analysis of Dividend Smoothing.
Journal of Corporate Finance 29: 200–20. [CrossRef]
Jensen, Michael C. 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic
Review 76: 323–29.
Jensen, Gerald, Donald Solberg, and Thomas Zorn. 1992. Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership,
Debt, and Dividend Policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27: 247–63. [CrossRef]
John, Kose, and Joseph Williams. 1985. Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium. The Journal of
Finance 40: 1053–70. [CrossRef]
Kadioglu, Eyup, and Nurcan Öcal. 2016. Dividend Changes and Future Profitability: Evidence from the Turkish
Stock Market. International Journal of Economics and Finance 8: 196–205. [CrossRef]
Kadioglu, Eyup, Niyazi Telçeken, and Nurcan Öcal. 2015. Market Reaction to Dividend Announcement: Evidence
from Turkish Stock Market. International Business Research 8: 83–94. [CrossRef]
Kumar, B. Rajesh, and K. Abdul Waheed. 2014. Determinants of Dividend Policy: Evidence from GCC Market.
Accounting and Finance Research 4: 17–29. [CrossRef]
Kuzucu, Narman. 2015. Determinants of Dividend Policy: A Panel Data Analysis for Turkish Listed Firms.
International Journal of Business and Management 10: 149–60. [CrossRef]
Lasfer, M. Ameziane. 1996. Taxes and Dividends: The UK Evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance 20: 455–72.
[CrossRef]
Levin, Andrew, Chien-Fu Lin, and Chia-Shang James Chu. 2002. Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and
Finite-Sample Properties. Journal of Econometrics 108: 1–24. [CrossRef]
Lintner, John. 1956. Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes.
American Economic Review 46: 97–113. [CrossRef]
Maldajian, Christopher, and Rim El Khoury. 2014. Determinants of the Dividend Policy: An Empirical Study on
the Lebanese Listed Banks. International Journal of Economics and Finance 6: 240–56. [CrossRef]
Marfo-Yiadom, Edward, and Samuel Kwaku Agyei. 2011. Determinants of Dividend Policy of Banks in Ghana.
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 61: 99–108.
Miller, Merton H., and Franco Modigliani. 1961. Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares.
The Journal of Business 34: 411–33. [CrossRef]
Miller, Merton H., and Kevin Rock. 1985. Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. The Journal of Finance
40: 1031–51. [CrossRef]
Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187–221. [CrossRef]
Nnadi, Matthias, Nyema Wogboroma, and Bariyima Kabel. 2013. Determinants of Dividend Policy: Evidence
from Listed Firms in the African Stock Exchanges. Panoeconomicus 60: 725–41. [CrossRef]
Okumus¸, Hacer S¸aduman. 2002. Market Structure and Efficiency as Determinants of Profitability in the Turkish
Banking Industry. Yapi Kredi Economic Review 13: 65–88.
Omet, Ghassan. 2004. Dividend Policy Behaviour in the Jordanian Capital Market. International Journal of Business
9: 287–300.
Papadopoulos, Dimitrios L., and Dimitrios P. Charalambidis. 2007. Focus on Present Status and Determinants of
Dividend Payout Policy: Athens Stock Exchange in Perspective. Journal of Financial Management & Analysis
20: 24–37.
Patra, Theophano, Sunil Poshakwale, and Kean Ow-Yong. 2012. Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy in
Greece. Applied Financial Economics 22: 1079–87. [CrossRef]
Pettit, R. Richardson. 1977. Taxes, Transactions Costs and the Clientele Effect of Dividends. Journal of Financial
Economics 5: 419–36. [CrossRef]
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 93 16 of 16
Phillips, Peter C. B., and Pierre Perron. 1988. Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression. Biometrika 75:
335–46. [CrossRef]
Rehman, Abdul, and Haruto Takumi. 2012. Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratio: Evidence from Karachi Stock
Exchange (KSE). Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business Research 1: 20–27.
Roodman, David. 2006. How to Do Xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata. In Stata
Journal 9: 83–136. [CrossRef]
Sayılgan, Güven, Hakan Karabacak, and Güray Küçükkocaog˘lu. 2006. The Firm-Specific Determinants of
Corporate Capital Structure: Evidence from Turkish Panel Data. Investment Management and Financial
Innovations 3: 125–39.
Tatog˘lu, Yerdelen Ferda. 2013. I˙leri Panel Veri Analizi Stata Uygulamalı. I˙stanbul: Beta Basım, Yayım, Dag˘ıtım.
Vo, Duc Hong, and Thanh-Yen van Nguyen. 2014. Managerial Ownership, Leverage and Dividend Policies:
Empirical Evidence from Vietnam’s Listed Firms. International Journal of Economics and Finance 6: 274–84.
[CrossRef]
Walter, James E. 1963. Dividend Policy: Its Influence on the Value of the Enterprise. The Journal of Finance 18:
280–91. [CrossRef]
Yıldız, Berk, Rasim I˙lker Gökbulut, and Turhan Korkmaz. 2014. Firmalarda Temettü Politikalarını Etkileyen
Unsurlar: Bist Sanayi I˙s¸letmeleri Üzerine Bir Panel Veri Uygulaması. AI˙BÜ-I˙I˙BF Ekonomik ve Sosyal
Aras¸tırmalar Dergisi 10: 259–92.
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
